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Executive Summary 
The compositional security certification methodology as presented in this document is the 
certification approach to be used in the scope of MILS security evaluations and certifications. The 
approach also provides means to integrate/compose compliant and certified components. 
It briefly presents the different options for certification regarding the structure of the composition, 
including specific information covering Common Criteria and IEC 62443. 
Concrete requirements for developers and methodology for evaluators is given so that the 
evaluation and certification process is supported through the use of this document, in addition to 
the requirements and methodology existent for both Common Criteria and IEC 62443. 
An assurance continuity approach is followed in order to allow the certificate maintenance remain 
while analyzing the patch management carried out by developers to their composite products. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
A usual desire when thinking on composition is that it maintains the level of assurance of 
underlying building blocks. Another good property would be to have constant assurance as the 
systems is maintained. 
We can approach their achievements by constructing a methodology based in the composition 
certification while guaranteeing the assurance continuity during a reasonable timing by analyzing 
the patching development process. 
The methodology asserts that if some assurance in the development process of the post-certificate 
patches has been checked, the composition should not lose the product certificate condition as a 
result of an upgrade.  
This composite evaluation methodology is not based on any preconceived evaluation assurance 
level beyond the assurance profile applied in the evaluation of the composed products. The 
assurance of the composite evaluation in respect to the assurance continuity depends on the user 
risk analysis when using upgraded compositions originally certified following this methodology. 
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Chapter 2 Compositional certification overview 
2.1 Composition life cycle 
The generic lifecycle of the composition comprises the components selection and composition 
certification. 
 
Figure 1: Composition life cycle 
 
2.1.1 Composition definition overview 
The architecture of the MILS platform can be considered as a composition. The architecture 
composition supposes the existence of an extended base component and a set of additional 
components called applications, using the security functions provided by the extended base 
component. 
The security requirements exhibited by the extended base component shall be based on a minimal 
base MILS Platform, which can be used either as a stand-alone, or including additional extension 
packages that include additional security functionality. 
 
Figure 2: Composition structure 
 
As an example, the components used to build the composition could be an OS separation kernel, 
extension packages and applications. These applications will use security functions provided by 
the OS and extension packages to achieve their security objectives. 
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2.1.2 Composition certification overview 
The composition shall address a previous integration and configuration phases to progress the 
composition to an evaluation readiness status. 
The composition certification methodology will include the standard evaluation plus some 
additional activities oriented to the assurance continuity. 
To guarantee the validity of the certificate of an already certified but upgraded composition during a 
reasonable timing, additional assurance activities have been extended for the patches 
management. Patching is considered always as an improvement of the products fixing known 
security bugs and therefore, requirements to this process are developed to guarantee that the 
patches are good enough to be tested by the developers, not only for their own functionality but 
also to avoid collateral effects. 
A categorisation of the types of changes and an impact analysis will be required to the developer. 
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Chapter 3 Composition definition 
The MILS platform architecture can be decomposed in the following abstract levels: 
- the base component and possible extension packages. 
- and a set of additional components called applications, using security functions and properties 
provided by the base component. 
 
3.1 Type of composition 
The MILS approach allows two composition strategies: 
- T-composition: the composition of the MILS platform with the applications running on the MILS 
platform. 
 
Figure 3: T-Composition 
 
- I-composition: the composition that makes up the MILS platform itself, using COTS hardware. 
 
Figure 4: I-Composition 
 
3.2 Certification of applications 
For the applications, two scenarios may be given for the composition certification:  
- The application has already been certified with a standard evaluation. For example, following 
with the example of the OS, the underlying OS separation kernel security features are included 
as assumptions in the security problem definition of the applications security targets. 
- The application will be evaluated in the context of the composition. 
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Chapter 4 Composition certification 
4.1 CC composition certification 
4.1.1 Certification of the base component and extension packages 
A modular Protection Profile is used to evaluate products with security targets according to PP 
configurations, which consist of a base Protection Profile and zero or more PP modules.  
The evaluation of the base component and possible extension packages requires the development 
of an ST according to the PP configuration consisting in the base MILS Platform Protection Profile 
[D21] and the possible modular PPs for the interested extension packages. 
 
Figure 5: PP and Product certification phases 
 
4.1.2 Applications composable features 
The key aspect to be considered when building a composition formed by one or more applications 
and the base component is the clear identification of the base component security features that the 
applications will use. 
If no security claims can be mapped to the base component evaluated features other than isolation 
between partitions, and there is only a single application, the evaluation of a single application will 
be equivalent to that of a monolithic application with full control of the HW. 
On the other hand, if instead of only one application, the composition is formed by the base 
component plus two or more applications, such composition shall be accurately defined so that it is 
clear how each part of the composition interacts with the others, and how the security features 
offered by all of them remain architecturally secure, available and trusted. 
For that purpose, two certification approaches (CPE and ACO, presented in next subsection) can 
be followed depending on the suitability for each composition scenario. 
Some examples of these composable features in the context of the OS separation kernel 
postulation may be: 
- Fault Tolerance. A control application is replicated on multiple partitions. Information flow 
between them is allowed for the implementation of a voting system for fault tolerance. Because 
of the kernel separation properties, if an application crashes or gets frozen, this does not affect 
the others. 
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- Trusted Updates for applications where the integrity of the update is checked in a specific 
partition before swiping it to the target partition. 
 
4.1.3 Composite product evaluation 
When the composition system is defined, we can address its evaluation according to the following 
scenarios: 
1. All the components are certified. 
2. The composition consists of an evaluated base component with unevaluated component. 
Depending on the scenario, it could be better to follow an ACO [CC3] evaluation if we are in 
scenario 1 or to follow a CPE [CC5] approach if we are scenario 2. 
The evaluation shall include also the extended package (ALC_PAT) for assurance continuity. 
4.1.3.1 CPE 
In this composition scenario where the application will be evaluated in the context of the 
composition, the CPE [CC5] shall be applied. 
 
Figure 6: CPE 
One of CPE’s main objectives is to enable installing one or several applications onto an already 
certified platform in order to reduce the evaluation effort while keeping a high level of confidence. 
To this end, CPE provides rules and guidance for a transfer of knowledge between platform and 
application supplier and for a reuse of existing evaluation evidence. 
 
4.1.3.2 ACO 
In this composition scenario where the application has already been certified, the ACO [CC3] shall 
be applied. 
 
Figure 7: ACO 
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The ACO’s main objective is to enable the certification of a composition of certified parts by 
examination and testing of the interfaces between the components, supported by examination 
of the design of the components and the conduct of vulnerability analysis. 
 
4.1.4 Extended package for assurance continuity 
Maintenance refers to the process undertaken by the developer in order to demonstrate that the 
changes implemented do not adversely affect the assurance baseline of the composition. 
The maintenance of the composition certificate is based in the analysis of the patches generation 
process. 
Then, in addition to the proper CC activities associated to ACO/CPE, the following extended 
package must be covered in the certification process: 
4.1.4.1 Patching Management (ALC_PAT) 
Objectives 
The objective of this family is to require the developer's patching management to have certain 
capabilities. These are meant to reduce the likelihood that functional error or vulnerabilities affects 
the certified composition and thus increasing the certificate validity period. 
Component leveling 
This family contains only one component. 
Application notes 
None 
ALC_PAT.1 Patching application 
Dependencies: No dependencies 
Developer action elements: 
ALC_PAT.1.1D The developer shall analyse and apply patches to the parts of the composite 
TOE for which updates have been released. 
ALC_PAT.1.2D The developer shall provide an Impact Analysis Report (IAR) recording the 
analysis of the impact of the changes to the certified composition. 
Content and presentation elements: 
ALC_PAT.1.1C The patch application procedures documentation shall describe the 
procedures used to track all the patches. 
Associated evaluation methodology 
ALC_PAT.1-1 The evaluator shall check that the patch application procedures 
describe the procedures used to track the patches. 
ALC_PAT.1-2 The evaluator shall check that the patch application procedures 
guarantee the application of all the patches associated to any part of the certified 
composition. 
ALC_PAT.1.2C The Impact Analysis Report (IAR) shall identify the component to which the 
patch has been applied. 
Associated evaluation methodology 
ALC_PAT.1-3 The evaluator shall check that the IAR identifies the component to 
which the patch has been applied. 
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ALC_PAT.1.3C The Impact Analysis Report (IAR) shall include a rationale indicating how the 
patch impact the security aspects of the certified composition. 
Associated evaluation methodology 
ALC_PAT.1-4 The evaluator shall check that the IAR includes a rationale indicating 
how the patch impacts the security aspects of the certified composition. 
ALC_PAT.1-5 The evaluator shall check that the rationale provided is complete and 
clear enough to allow identify how the security aspects of the certified composition 
are affected. 
ALC_PAT.1.4C The Impact Analysis Report (IAR) shall summarize the additional security 
functionality the patch adds to the composite TOE. 
Associated evaluation methodology 
ALC_PAT.1-6 The evaluator shall check that the summary is clear enough to allow 
identifying which security functionality is included and how this functionality affects 
the certified composition. 
If no additional security functionality is included in the patch, this work unit is not 
applicable. 
Evaluator actions elements: 
ALC_PAT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all 
requirements for content and presentation of evidence. 
 
4.2 IEC 62443 composition certification 
In this section, as it will be needed below, we first discuss the general (composition-independent) 
configurability of IEC 62443 certification (Section 4.2.1), the applied maturity model (Section 4.2.2), 
then we describe applicable standards and scenarios (Section 4.2.3), followed by a discussion of 
process assessment specifications (Section 4.2.4) and product assessment specifics (Section 
4.2.5), with the focus on a composition context. 
The concept of IEC 62443 certification described below is based on Industrial Cyber Security 
Program under the IECEE system. The IEC System for Conformity Assessment Schemes for 
Electrotechnical Equipment and Components (IECEE) is a multilateral certification system based 
on IEC International Standards. The principle of mutual recognition (reciprocal acceptance) of test 
results to obtain certification or approval at national levels around the world is applied. The System 
is the operator of the very successful IECEE CB Scheme, a one-stop shop that offers the potential 
of one test and one certification, recognized internationally. Moreover, the system is accessible to 
anyone anywhere, including in non-IEC member countries. 
The certification scheme was designed by CMC Task Force Cyber Security under the IECEE and 
presents a unique approach for conformity assessment to IEC 62443 series of standards and for 
conformity assessments in the area of cyber security generally. 
 
4.2.1 Configurability 
The most important feature and distinction of the IECEE Industrial Cyber Security Program 
[OD2061] is configurability. Configurability means that the applicant chooses the requirements that 
will be assessed, therefore he creates the scope of the assessment. That is done based on 
product/process specifications, risk analysis and/or final user requirements. Requirements of the 
selected standard that were not chosen will be assessed as “not applicable”. 
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Because of this new approach, the certificates also have few specifics. Instead of demonstration of 
conformity to the full standard, it shows Requirements assessed / Total Requirements ratio. 
“Requirements assessed” represents a number of requirements that were successfully assessed. 
“Total Requirements” represents a total number of requirements in the highest organizational level 
of selected IEC 62443 standard. Those levels are as follows: 
 Summary Levels - defined in IEC 62443-2-4  
 Practices - defined in IEC 62443-4-1  
 Foundational Requirements - defined in IEC 62443-3-3 and 62443-4-2 
The example for IEC 62443-4-1 capability (Practice): 
SR (4/5) 
means that there are 5 requirements in Practice 2 (Specification of security requirements) and 4 of 
them were met. 
 
4.2.2 Maturity model 
The applicant also chooses a maturity level for each requirement. Maturity levels with description 
relevant for product suppliers (manufacturers) and their development processes are described in 
the table below. 
Level Description 
1  
(Initial) 
Product supplier (manufacturer) is developing products in an ad-hoc manner 
and without a documented process.  
2  
(Managed) 
Product (manufacturer) has the capability to develop products according to 
written policies and procedures describing the secure development lifecycle 
(including objectives). Product manufacturer also has evidence to show that 
personnel have the expertise, are trained and/or are capable of following the 
written procedures.  
Development practices are repeatable, even during times of stress. When 
these practices are in place, their execution will be performed and managed 
according to their documented plans. 
3  
(Defined 
/Practiced) 
A development process at Level 3 is a Level 2 development process that the 
product supplier (manufacturer) has practiced for an concrete product at 
least once. 
The performance of a Level 3 development process can be shown to be 
repeatable across the product supplier’s organization. 
4 
(Improving) 
The product manufacturer (manufacturer) demonstrate continuous 
improvement, such as more effective procedures. This results in a security 
program that improves the development process through 
technological/procedural/management changes. 
Table 1: Maturity model 
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4.2.3 Applicable standards and scenarios 
As already identified in the D1.1 deliverable [D11], the most suitable standards from IEC 62443 
series for the certMILS project and it´s compositional approach are: 
 IEC 62443-4-1 Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-1: Secure 
product development lifecycle requirements and 
 IEC 62443-4-2 Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical 
security requirements for IACS components 
The IEC 62443 series of standards generally specify requirements for security capabilities. These 
capabilities may be technical capabilities (security mechanisms) or process capabilities (human 
procedures). IEC 62443 conformance assessment consists of the evaluation of an applicant’s 
security capabilities that it uses to develop, integrate and/or maintain specific products or solutions. 
Two evaluations can be conducted:  
1) To evaluate an applicant’s ability to provide IEC 62443 compliant security capabilities. This 
assessment focuses on evidence that supports the Applicant’s submittal. This submittal 
contains the specific requirements and the processes used to implement the security 
capabilities for which they are requesting to be assessed.  
2) To evaluate that these capabilities have been applied to:  
a) a specific product or  
b) a specific solution.  
 
This creates two possible scenarios for certification:  
 Scenario 1 – Capability Assessment: An assessment of a set of capabilities typically described 
in a plan or set of policies / procedures  
 Scenario 2 – Application of Capabilities Assessment: Use of a Scenario 1 capability for a 
specific product or solution 
 
When applied to the specific standards of IEC 62443 series applicable for certMILS project, the 
concrete scenarios are as follows: 
- IEC 62443-4-1 
o Process Capability Assessment 
o Product Application Capability Assessment 
- IEC 62443-4-2 
o Product Capability Assessment 
They are described more into detail in the following subsections (4.2.4 and 4.2.5). 
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4.2.4 Process assessment 
 
Figure 8: Security lifecycle, based on [IEC62443-1-1, Figure 5] 
 
As shown in Figure 8, IEC 62443 suggests a lifecyle with continuous improvement, which is 
adopted from [VDIVDE2182].  
This lifecycle shall exist at various product life cycle stages, at the level of product supplier, system 
integrator, and service provider [IEC62443-1-1, Figure 6], as depicted in Figure 9. What is 
important to note is that the lifecycles are continuous and chained together. 
 
Figure 9: View of chained security lifecycles of component producers, integrators, and operators based on 
[IEC62443-1-1, Figure 6] and [VDE0831-104, Figure 5]. 
 
Where the main focus lies on the secure development lifecycle (SDL) of a product supplier 
(depicted is the left-most circle in Figure 9), the main interest should be for IEC 62443-4-1 and its 
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requirements. The requirements are focusing on security requirements definition, secure design, 
secure implementation, verification and validation, defect management, patch management and 
product end-of-life processes. These requirements can be applied to new or existing processes for 
developing, maintaining and retiring hardware, software or firmware for new or existing products. 
 
Process assessment scenario for IEC 62443-4-1 
IEC 62443-4-1 Process certification – Scenario 1 
Product supplier (manufacturer) has a development process for securely developing and 
supporting one or more products as required by IEC 62443-4-1. Following is the example for 
scenario 1 (the first of the two scenarios that were defined in Section 4.2.3): 
• A product supplier has a formal development process, such as an ISO 9001 compliant 
process.  
• The product developer has incorporated security into its product development processes 
according to 62443-4-1 
• These security enhanced processes are formally documented.  
• The product supplier submits an application for its development process to be assessed for 
conformance 62443-4-1. 
 
4.2.5 Product assessment 
The product could be a system, subsystem or component such as network component, host 
device, embedded device and application. The candidate standards for product based scenarios 
are IEC 62443-4-2 and IEC 62443-4-1. There is a strong connection between IEC 62443-4-1 and 
IEC 62443-4-2 as IEC 62443-4-1 requirements require that security requirements for the product 
are identified (e.g. IEC 62443-4-2) and properly implemented in the product (with verification). 
 
Product assessment scenarios 
62443-4-1 - Product certification – Scenario 2 
Product supplier (manufacturer) has developed a product and supporting services (e.g. patching) 
using processes that were performed in accordance with requirements of  
IEC 62443-4-1. Following is the example: 
• A product supplier has developed a product using 62443-4-1 processes.  
• Those processes require the product supplier to apply security-related processes to all 
phases of development and support.  
• The product supplier has generated documentation that shows it has followed it secure 
development processes for the product. 
• This documentation shows traceability of security requirements through requirements 
definition, design and implementation, and testing. 
• The product supplier submits an application to be assessed for conformance. 
 
At the time of writing the scenarios for IEC 62443-4-2 are still in the preparation phase but they will 
follow the same principles described above. Expected time of completion is the end of 2018. 
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4.3 A pervasive compositional approach for use of a separation kernel 
 
Figure 10: Chained security lifecycles in a MILS system 
 
Note that the system integrators and service operators (i.e. railway companies, grid operators etc.) 
of Figure 9 (Section 4.2.4) are not directly represented in the certMILS prototypes. With regard to 
the actors in Figure 9, what we “only” have in the certMILS prototypes are in the railway, subway, 
and smart grid, are the product suppliers, which also occur left-most in Figure 9. However, 
certMILS also does have a notion of chained security lifecycles, once we add the separation kernel 
supplier, as shown in Figure 10. 
In this section we discuss how the CC assurance gained for the separation kernel can be used to 
gain IEC 62443 assurance for the prototypes. We do this for IEC 62443-4-1 process requirements 
in Section 4.3.1 and for IEC 62443-4-2 functional requirements in Section 4.3.2. We also give a 
justification why this can be done for a separation kernel that has been certified according to CC in 
Section 4.3.3. 
 
4.3.1 Process 
Using a separation kernel automatically enforces a partitioned architecture, which can be used to 
give credit to design assurance. As discussed in [D2.3, Section 4], the use of a separation kernel 
strongly supports adherence to the following process requirements of IEC 62443-4-1 (see Table 2). 
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ID Evidence supporting compliance with IEC 62443-4-1 requirements  
SR-2 This requirement is about threat models with clear trust boundaries. The trust 
boundaries in a separation kernel are the partitions. 
SD-1 This requirement states that a process shall be employed for developing and 
documenting a secure design that identifies and each exposed interface of the 
product, including physical and logical interfaces. Such documentation is provided 
by describing the domain separation in a separation kernel. 
SD-2 A process shall be employed for including multiple layers of defense where each 
layer provides additional defense mechanisms. Each layer should assume that the 
layer in front of it may be compromised. A separation kernel is a defense in depth. 
SD-6 This requirements asks to use least privilege (granting only the privileges to 
users/software necessary to perform intended operations); using proven secure 
components/designs where possible; economy of mechanism (striving for simple 
designs); using secure design patterns; attack surface reduction; and that all trust 
boundaries are documented as part of the design. All these activities are supported 
by the use of a separation kernel. 
Table 2: IEC 62443-4-1 Requirements fulfilled by a use of separation kernels 
In a pervasive approach, one could use the set of process requirements indicated in Table 2 as a 
(small) configuration (for the concept of configurations see Section 4.2.1) for an initial IEC 62443-4-
1 process certification, giving SR (1/5) and SD (3/6). 
 
4.3.2 Product 
As discussed in Section 4.3.1 the use of a separation kernel strongly supports adherence to the 
IEC 62443-4-1 process requirements. It can further support the following component requirements 
defined in 62443-4-2 (see Table 3). Description of requirements is based on the draft of the 
standard as the final version of the standard has not yet been published. 
ID Evidence supporting compliance with IEC 62443-4-2 requirements 
CR 5.1 Components shall support a segmented network as defined in ISA 62443-3-2, as 
needed, to support the broader network architecture based on logical segmentation 
and criticality. This is relevant for certMILS use cases that connect different 
networks to functionality. 
CR 7.1 Components shall provide the capability to maintain essential functions in a 
degraded mode during a DoS event. This is relevant for certMILS use cases where 
availability matters. 
CR 7.2 Components shall provide the capability to limit the use of resources by security 
functions to prevent resource exhaustion. This is relevant for certMILS use cases 
where availability matters. 
Table 3: IEC 62443-4-2 Requirements that a separation kernel can help the prototypes with 
Thus, in a pervasive approach, one could use the set of product requirements indicated in Table 2 
as a (small) configuration (for the concept of configurations see Section 4.2.1) for an initial IEC 
62443-4-2 product certification, giving CR 5 (1/3) and CR 7 (2/8). 
 
4.3.3 Validity of separation kernel CC-certification for IEC 62443 prototypes 
In a world where resources were unlimited, the separation kernel would also have undergone a 
more broader 62443-4-X certification. However, as separation kernels are general purpose 
products, and not limited to industrial control systems, from a market perspective, for a separation 
D1.3-Compositional security certification methodology   
certMILS D1.3 Page 15 of 20 
kernel vendor it is more meaningful to certify against CC. Hence we argue that the CC process 
requirements are sufficient for a separation kernel to be used as a component.  
The most important argument why a CC certification is sufficient for a MILS separation kernel to be 
used in a CC context is that the core activity of the CC as well as of IEC 62443-4-1 is to do a threat 
analysis, based on the identification of assets, threats, adverse agents, security objectives and 
functional measures to achieve them. IEC 62443-1-1 explicitly has adopted a thread model based 
on the CC model [IEC-62443-1-1, Section 5, Figures 2 and 3]. This also can be seen in the 
chained lifecycle depicted in Figure 10. 
In addition, with regards to lifecycle, even at moderate EAL levels CC bring in lifecycle assurance, 
which can be mapped to IEC 62443-4-1 (see Table 4). 
CC activity IEC 62443 counterpart 
Development (ADV) IEC 62443-4-1 Practice 3 Secure by Design; 
Practice 4 Secure Implementation 
Testing (ATE) IEC 62443-4-1 Practice 5 Testing 
Vulnerability analysis (AVA) IEC 62443-4-1 SV-4 Penetration testing 
Configuration management capabilities (ALC_CMC) IEC 62443-1-1 Section 8 Lifecycle 
Configuration management scope (ALC_CMS)  IEC 62443-1-1 Section 8 Lifecycle 
Delivery (ALC_DEL)  IEC 62443-1-1 Section 8 Lifecycle 
Development security (ALC_DVS)  IEC 62443-4-1 SM-7 Development 
environment security 
Life-cycle definition (ALC_LCD)  IEC 62443-1-1 Section 8 Lifecycle 
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR) IEC 62443-4-1 Practice 6 Security defect 
management 
Table 4: Mapping of CC activities to IEC 62443 
 
The sufficiency of CC certification for operating systems is also indicated in IsaSecure’s guideline 
for the application of IEC 62443-4-1, SDLA-312 [SDLA312, MIV-5 (Module Implementation & 
Verification)], suggests that “If the product includes a Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) operating 
system, then the operating system shall either meet the requirements of this development phase or 
be certified to Common Criteria EAL 3 or higher or be certified to a comparable security standard, 
or compensating controls must be included in the product to ensure that security vulnerabilities in 
the operating system do not result in vulnerabilities above a certain severity level in the product.” 
Similar, for the railway sector, VDE 0831-104 [VDE0831-104, p. 19] states for compatible 
certifications that “it is assumed that in future railway signalling systems components with IT 
security tasks are usually purchased on the marked and not developed in-house. It is assumed that 
such components already have a certification compatible with IEC 62443. If this does not apply, 
after checking the requirements one also could accept other certificates or compare with a 
reference system”. 
Therefore, we conclude that a CC certification of a separation kernel suffices for its use as 
subcomponent of a product under 62443-4-1/62443-4-2 certification. 
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Chapter 5 Assurance Continuity 
This section will include the definition of the assurance continuity process. It covers the 
methodology for the assurance continuity in terms of what is expected from the developer and 
what is to be performed by the evaluator. 
5.1 Patch management 
5.1.1 Patching system 
The patching system used by the developer must implement: 
1. information gathering activities for patch management, including inventory of patchable 
system, supportability, product supplier relationship building, and evaluation and 
assessment of the existing environment. 
2. project planning and implementation activities for patch management, including developing 
the business case, definition of roles and responsibilities, establishing a patch deployment 
infrastructure, and establishing a backup and restoration infrastructure. 
3. procedures and policies for patch management, including monitoring for patches, patch 
evaluation, testing, patch deployment, and change management. 
4. activities of operating a patch management system, including executing the procedure and 
policies, vulnerability awareness, outage scheduling, inventory maintenance, new device 
additions, reporting and key performance indicators (KPIs), and auditing and verification. 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY: The evaluator must check and confirm that all these 
requirements are satisfied. 
 
5.1.2 Impact Analysis Report (IAR) 
The developer shall provide an Impact Analysis Report (IAR) recording the analysis of the impact 
of the changes to the certified composition. 
Performing an impact analysis and the generation of the corresponding IAR procedures are 
defined in [CC6]. 
In addition to what is indicated in [CC6], it must also indicate, when applicable: 
1. Component standard patches fixing internal Bugs that do not affect the external interfaces 
or the associated security functionality. 
2. Component standard patches fixing internal Bugs that affect the external interfaces or the 
associated security functionality. 
3. Patches adding security functionality 
4. New application or base-component (e.g. platform) or extension package integration 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY: The evaluator must check and confirm that all these 
requirements are satisfied. 
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5.1.3 Developer Regression Testing 
According to the impact analysis, the developer shall execute regression testing on the updated 
TOE recording its results and making them accessible for the final user. 
The developer test plan must include tests for each patch applied. The granularity of the tests must 
be at a level such that all the aspects of each patch are tested. 
The test cases must detail the configuration used for the test, the prerequisites to be satisfied 
including ordering dependencies, test steps, expected results and actual results. 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY: The evaluator must check that the developer test plan and 
report satisfies these requirements. 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY: The evaluator must confirm that the developer test plan is 
consistent with the patching system and with the Impact Analysis Report. 
 
5.1.4 Reusability of Base-component Evaluation Certificates 
In order to reuse existing component certificates, the evaluation of these components must be 
sufficiently up-to-date and remain valid at the time of the maintenance. 
 
5.2 IEC 62443 Specifics 
With regards to the IEC 62443 certification scheme (described in Section 4.2), an IEC 62443 
certificate issued under the Industrial Cyber Security Program under the IECEE system does not 
have an expiration date. The scheme assumes that the assurance continuity is ensured by the IEC 
62443 Process Requirements and it is a solely responsibility of the applicant (in this case the 
product supplier), who is driven by his customer requirements and the applicant´s product/process. 
 
5.3 Pervasive compositional approach specifics 
With regard to the pervasive approach (described Section 4.3), the separation kernel developer is 
to follow the CC assurance continuity approach and to notify the MILS system users (prototypes) 
with updates / guidance should security flaws that affect the MILS system security objectives, in 
the same way it is done for IEC 62443 process. 
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Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusion 
This document covers the compositional certification and evaluation methodology to be applied on 
products based on the MILS architecture. For that purpose, two certification standards have been 
covered and extended: CC and IEC 62443. The methodology is common in several phases for 
both CC and IEC 62443, but different approaches must be considered for fulfilling specific aspects 
of each standard, and such differences have been detailed in previous sections. 
The MILS architecture concept makes the certification approach compositional. Such certification 
approach allows the certification of the composition of several already certified parts making the 
certification effort easier and less time-consuming. 
Regarding the maintenance of the certification, an assurance continuity approach is considered 
based on the patching system the vendor must cover and satisfy after the certification. 
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Chapter 7 List of Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Translation 
ACO Common Criteria Composition Assurance Class 
ALC Common Criteria Life Cycle Assurance Class 
CC Common Criteria 
CPE Composite Product Evaluation 
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level 
IAR Impact Analysis Report 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
MILS Multiple Independent Levels of Security 
OS Operating System 
PP Protection Profile 
ST Security Target 
TOE Target of Evaluation 
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